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Introduction: 
Article I § 9 clause 7 of the United States Constitution makes it clear that “No Money 
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”1  This 
single sentence provides Congress with the sole authority to allocate money out of the federal 
treasury.2  Throughout the years, Congress has fleshed out this power through legislation 
governing how the appropriations and budgeting process should occur.  Although Congress has 
been granted the constitutional authority to make appropriations, the President and the executive 
agencies that receive the funds appropriated by Congress have made themselves influential 
partners in this process, often through purely political means.3   
Despite the processes that Congress has put in place, the United States is facing a fiscal 
tsunami should things continue at their current trajectory.4  One of these budgetary processes put 
in place by Congress, the supplemental appropriations process, has resulted in increased outlays 
that avoid the transparency provided through the normal budget process.5  This paper suggests 
that Congress reform the supplemental appropriations process, and proposes a piece of 
legislation called the Transparency and Accountability in Supplemental Appropriations Act 
(TASA).  TASA would provide increased transparency and political accountability to the 
supplemental appropriations process.  It would do so by creating an Emergency Trust Fund to be 
included in the regular budget and by requiring that the President’s Budget and the 
Congressional Budget Resolution include Contingency Allowances representing the level of any 
supplemental appropriations used to pay for military conflicts during the prior fiscal year.  These 
reforms would allow Congress to lower the impact of the upcoming fiscal tsunami by reducing 
overall budget costs.6 
 
 
                                                 
1 U.S. Const. art. I, 9, cl. 7. 
2 See generally U.S. Const. 
3 See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Titles I-IX of P.L. 93-344) § 302(a), codified at 2 U.S.C.A. § 
601 et seq. (2005). 
4 See U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, The Nation’s Long-Term Fiscal Outlook 1 (April 2008), [hereinafter GAO-08-783R]. 
5 Discussed in Section II of this paper. 
6 See infra note 18 (to close the fiscal gap, and potentially avoid the fiscal tsunami, current federal spending must be immediately 
reduced by at least 17%). 
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Syllabus: 
Section I of this paper examines what is meant by “fiscal tsunami.”  This section 
examines the causes of the fiscal tsunami and the potential consequences should nothing be 
done.  Section II provides an overview of the regular federal budget process.  Following 
discussion of this process, Section III examines the supplemental appropriations process and how 
this process relates to the fiscal tsunami.  Section IV discusses the historical use of the 
supplemental appropriations process, primarily looking at its use for funding various war and 
natural disasters.  Section V consists of a reform proposal, entitled TASA, for the supplemental 
appropriations process and looks at the potential benefits and trade-offs of reform. 
Section I:  The Fiscal Tsunami: 
Currently, the long-term budgeting outlook for the federal government is dim.7  The 
nation is facing ballooning deficits in the coming years, much of it due to a combination of 
increasing discretionary spending and an increasing budgetary burden from mandatory 
entitlement spending such as Social Security and Medicare.8  Those Americans who have been 
paying into these social safety nets all their lives are at risk of finding that when it comes time to 
collect, the federal government will not be able meet its financial obligation.9 
A major driver, if not the primary driver, of this problem is America’s aging population.10  
The Social Security and Medicare programs are set up so that current workers pay for the 
benefits of current recipients.11  Since the large baby-boomer population is aging, there will be 
comparatively fewer workers paying into the system for each recipient.12  In time, this will put a 
strain on these programs and cause ballooning deficits.13  The longer that the federal government 
declines to address this issue, the more likely it is that drastic measures would be  required to 
maintain solvency.14   
                                                 
7 See GAO-08-783R. 
8 GAO-08-783R, at 2-3. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id.  
13 Id. at 8. 
14 Compare id. at 6 with id. at 7. 
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To put this all into perspective we can look at a 2008 Report by the Government 
Accountability Office called The Nation’s Long-Term Fiscal Outlook.15  Even in the report’s 
more optimistic projections, the federal government would require “federal revenue as a share of 
GDP … [to be] increased by [33%] or non-interest federal spending … [to be] cut by [25%] 
should it wait until 2040 to tackle the fiscal tsunami and balance the budget.”16  As the report 
explains, “If changes in federal individual income taxes were the sole means used to balance the 
budget, these would have to increase by almost 60%.”17  GAO-08-783R estimates that if action 
were taken today, such action would need to be significantly less drastic than that which would 
be required in the future.  If the federal government acted to close the fiscal gap today, it would 
need to increase revenue as a share of GDP by 16.9%  (16.1% less than the 2040 number) or cut 
all non-interest federal spending by 17% (8% less than the 2040 number).18  Under this scenario, 
the percent increase in federal individual income tax required to get the budget on track would be 
37.2% (22.8% less than the 2040 number).19  These changes, while significant when examined in 
isolation, are much less severe than those that would be needed in 2040 or later.     
Any solution to the fiscal tsunami will likely incorporate a combination of both decreased 
spending and increased revenue.  Reforming the supplemental appropriations process is one 
potential source of spending reductions.  As will be explained in the next section, the current 
supplemental appropriations process provides Congress, and the President, a method of 
bypassing the transparency and debate provided through normal budgeting rules.  During the past 
four years, supplemental appropriations have consisted of 6.3% (2005)20, 4.5% (2006)21, 4.2% 
(2007)22, and 4.4% (2008)23 of the total budget authority.  According to Thomas L. Hungerford 
in a recent Congressional Research Report, “Had supplemental appropriations been fully offset 
                                                 
15 See GAO-08-783R, at 1. 
16 Id. at 6. 
17 Id.  
18 Id. at 7. 
19 Id. 
20 Thomas L. Hungerford, Supplemental Appropriations: Trends and Budgetary Impacts Since 1981, at 1 Cong. Res. Service, 
Jan. 2, 2009 (available at http://opencrs.com/document/RL33134/2009-01-02) (last visited May 1, 2009) (citing Cong. Budget 
Office, CBO data on Supplemental Budget Authority for the 2000s, at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6630/SuppApprops.pdf, last visited  May 1, 2009). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
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since 1981, federal debt held by the public could have been reduced by about 23%.”24  These are 
not insignificant numbers.  The savings realized from immediately eliminating supplemental 
appropriations would provide for just under one-third of the non-interest federal spending 
decrease needed to avoid the fiscal tsunami.25  Although complete elimination is not realistic,26 
the political pressures created by the introduction of additional transparency and accountability 
measures into the supplemental appropriations process would have the potential to decrease a 
portion of the spending done through supplemental appropriations and therefore contribute 
toward the avoidance or softening of the fiscal tsunami. 
Section II: The Budget Process 
In order to understand the problems with the supplemental appropriations process, it is 
important to look at the federal budgeting and appropriations process as a whole.  This will 
provide context to the problem and a background for understanding potential solutions. 
In addition to Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution27, the budget process is generally 
guided by a combination of statutes28 and parliamentary rules29. 
Key Concepts 
 It is important to be familiar with several budgetary and appropriations concepts before 
delving into the timeline of the budget process.  One of these concepts is the distinction between 
an authorization and an appropriation.  Article I § 9 of the Constitution gives Congress the power 
to make “appropriations.”30  There is no mention of authorizations.31  The distinction between 
these two concepts is a consequence of the evolution of the Congressional Process and how 
Congress has decided to do business.  Generally, the idea is that an authorization act is used to 
                                                 
24 Thomas L. Hungerford, Supplemental Appropriations: Trends and Budgetary Impacts Since 1981, at 10 Cong. Res. Service, 
Jan. 2, 2009 [hereinafter Hungerford, CRS]. 
25 This figure is determined by using  4.85%, Supra note 23, as the amount of total budget authority supplemental appropriations 
take up (the average from the past four fiscal years) and 17% as the needed reduction in non-interest federal spending Supra note 
21.  
26 Congress will need at least some flexibility to respond to drastic changes of circumstance requiring additional funding.   
27 U.S. Const. art. I, 9. 
28 See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Titles I-IX of P.L. 93-344) § 302(a), codified at 2 U.S.C.A. 
§ 633(a) (2005). 
29 ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS, 22-26 (rev. ed. 2007) [hereinafter SCHICK]. 
30 U.S. Const. art. I, 9.  
31 Id. 
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“establish, continue, or modify agencies or programs.”32 Although a program has been 
authorized by Congress, it still has not yet received funds.  In order to fund the program, an 
appropriations act providing that program proper budget authority is needed.33  Furthermore, 
Congress has delegated these two functions to separate types of committees.34  The House and 
Senate both have numerous authorizing committees dealing with various subject matters.35  Each 
chamber also has a Committee on Appropriations.36  Each of these appropriations committees 
has established several sub-committees dealing with different subject matters.37  Each of these 
sub-committees handles the appropriation side of roughly corresponding authorizing 
committee’s subject matter.38  Since the establishment and funding of a program generally 
requires both an authorization and appropriation act,39 it will need the benefaction of both the 
authorizing committee and appropriations sub-committee handling that program’s subject 
matter.40 
 There are several exceptions and quasi-exceptions to this authorization and appropriation 
requirement.  One exception is the supplemental appropriations process that will be later 
discussed at length.  Another, a quasi-exception, is the result of the distinction between 
mandatory and discretionary spending.  Mandatory spending is spending that the federal 
government must pay to meet a commitment.41  This primarily arises from entitlement programs 
like Social Security.42  Programs like these arise when an authorizing act becomes law and 
commits federal funding to a recipient as long as the program’s eligibility requirements are 
fulfilled.43  A commitment created by such legislation forces the House and Senate Committees 
on Appropriations to provide sufficient budget authority.44  Discretionary spending, on the other 
                                                 
32 Sandy Streeter, The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction, at 24 Cong. Res. Service, Feb. 22, 2007 
(available at http://appropriations.house.gov/pdf/appfacts.pdf ) (last visited May 1, 2009) [hereinafter Streeter, CRS]. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 4, 24. 
37 Id. at 10. 
38 See Streeter, CRS, at 2. 
39 Id. at 24. 
40 Id. at 17. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 See Streeter, CRS, at 17. 
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hand, is spending where there is no commitment.45  Discretionary spending generally requires 
the passage of an annual, no year, or multi-year appropriation and relevant Congressional 
authorization legislation. 46 
Budgetary Timeline 
Armed with some background knowledge, it is now a good time to examine the timeline 
of the budget.   
Step 1: Submission of the President’s Budget 
 The first step of the budget process is the President’s submission of an annual budget to 
Congress, as required by 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a).47  According to statutory requirements, the 
submission is supposed to occur on or before the first Monday in February.48  The President’s 
Budget requests funding for the following fiscal year49 for each of the programs and agencies of 
the federal government.50  Additionally, the President’s budget includes materials from each 
agency justifying each agency’s requested funding levels.51   
Step 2: Congressional Adoption of a Budget Resolution 
 2 U.S.C. §§ 631-645 requires Congress to adopt a Budget Resolution following 
submission of the President’s budget.52  The Senate and House Budget Committees craft the 
Budget Resolution which “sets new budget authority and outlay levels for each fiscal year 
covered by the resolution”53 and splits spending into twenty functional categories.54  If all goes 
as planned, each chamber’s Budget Committee submits their version of the Budget Resolution 
for consideration within their particular chamber.  Following House and Senate passage, any 
                                                 
45 Id. at 24. 
46 Id. 
47 “On or after the first Monday in January but not later than the first Monday in February of each year, the President shall submit 
a budget of the United States Government for the following fiscal year.” 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a). 
48 Id. 
49 Federal government fiscal years begin on the October 1 of a year and end the following September 30. 
50 See SCHICK at 84-85. 
51 Id. at 98, 233, 270. 
52 2 U.S.C. §§ 631-645 (2005). 
53 Streeter, CRS, at 4. 
54 See Streeter, CRS, at 4; See also SCHICK at 124-125. 
 8
differences between the two versions of the resolution are settled in Conference Committee.55  
Although never signed by the President and made into law56, the Budget Resolution can be 
influential nonetheless because it sets spending ceilings, referred to as § 302(a) allocations, for 
the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations.57  These ceilings, and the Budget 
Resolution as a whole, are enforced by points of order provided in the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974.58  It is possible to bypass these rules with an act of 
Congress,59 and also possible for Congress to fail to pass a Budget Resolution.60 Although this is 
not uncommon, a Budget Resolution does usually get passed.61 
Step 3: The Appropriations Committees: 
 If the Budget Resolution is passed as anticipated, the House and Senate Committees on 
Appropriations then begin working on the twelve appropriations bills that compromise the 
federal budget.62  Each of the appropriations bills are handled by the various appropriation sub-
committees.63  The spending ceilings, called § 302(b) allocations, in the Budget Resolution are 
further divided up among these sub-committees.64  The sub-committees generally hold hearings 
for each bill where agency directors and other interested parties are called to testify in order to 
provide input.65  Traditionally, the House Committee on Appropriations is the first to consider 
each appropriation bill.66  Following passage from the house, the Senate generally amends the 
House bill to come up with its own version.67  Each bill is now put into conference committee 
                                                 
55 See SCHICK at 136-138. 
56 Id. at 118. 
57 SCHICK at 149-151; Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Titles I-IX of P.L. 93-344) § 302(a), 
codified at 2 U.S.C.A. § 633(a) (2005). 
58 The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 Act (Titles I-IX of P.L. 93-344) §§ 302(f), 311(a). codified 
at 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 633(f), 642(a) (2005). 
59 36 Comp. Gen. 240, 242 (1956) (“One Congress cannot bind a future Congress and … Congress has full power to make an 
appropriation in excess of a cost limitation contained in the original authorization act.”); House Rules XXI, XXII; Senate Rule 
XVI. 
60 “Congress failed to complete action on a budget resolution four of the nine years between 1998 and 2006.” SCHICK at 141. 
61 Prior to 1998, the budget resolution was commonly passed, though not always on schedule.  Even after 1998, a budget 
resolution has been passed more often than not.   
62 Streeter, CRS, at  2, 10. 
63 Id. 
64 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Titles I-IX of P.L. 93-344) § 302(b), codified at 2 U.S.C.A. § 
633(b) (2005). 
65 See SCHICK at 233-236. 
66 See SCHICK at 232; See Streeter, CRS, at 5. 
67 See SCHICK at 232; See Streeter, CRS, at 5. 
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where a compromise is worked out.68  Following conference committee and passage from both 
chambers, each of these bills is finally presented to the President for signing into law.69  
Throughout this process, authorization committees may be involved should a particular agency 
or project need to be reauthorized or should a new project or agency need initial authorization.70   
The above description provides a basic framework of the regular budget process.  The 
process incorporates checks and balances between the President and Congress, between House 
and Senate, and between appropriations and authorization (and budget) committees.  This 
process often becomes quite convoluted in practice and rarely goes quite as planned,71 but it 
incorporates a good deal of input from various parts governmental players and outside 
constituencies.72   
The Reconciliation Process and Continuing Resolutions  
The Reconciliation Process and passage of Continuing Resolutions are two budget 
mechanisms worth briefly mentioning.  These mechanisms are not ‘regular’ parts of the budget 
process, but are used when the situation warrants. 
 The Reconciliation Process is sometimes used following the passage of a Congressional 
Budget Resolution.73  The Reconciliation Process allows Congress and the President “to bring 
revenue and direct spending under existing laws into conformity with the levels set in the budget 
resolution.”74  This optional process requires passage and signing of a reconciliation bill.75  It is 
often used as a way for Congress and the President to enact sweeping revenue and tax changes.   
 Continuing Resolutions occur when the appropriations process drags out through the start 
of a fiscal year.76  At this point agencies and programs that have yet received funding are at risk 
                                                 
68 See SCHICK at 232; See Streeter, CRS, at 6, 9. 
69 See Streeter, CRS, at 10. 
70 But see SCHICK at 200 (“In most cases, unauthorized appropriations are fully available for obligation and expenditure). 
71 The frequent failure of Congress to pass a Budget Resolution in an example of this. Supra note 61. 
72 See SCHICK at 233-236. 
73 SCHICK at 142. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 260-263. 
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of shutting down.77  In such situations, Congress commonly passes a Continuing Resolution that 
provides funding at the level of the previous fiscal year or at reduced levels.78   
Section IV: The Supplemental Appropriations Process 
The supplemental appropriation process provides a means for Congress to provide 
additional funding during the fiscal year.  Since 1981, the use of supplemental appropriations has 
increased the public national debt by $1,332 billion.79  From 2004 to 2008, the use of 
supplemental appropriations has increased each year’s fiscal budget by 4-6%.80  You may 
wonder how this occurs.  The following section will explain how it occurs.  Why it may occur 
will be examined further in Section IV and V, but it is likely due to a combination of political 
convenience and actual necessity. 
 During the course of the fiscal year, some federal agencies realize they need more money.  
This could be due to an unforeseen disaster, a recently decided military operation, or other 
change of circumstance resulting in an agency’s current funds being insufficient.  In response to 
this, a supplemental appropriations process has developed.  Supplemental appropriations are 
intended to provide additional funding to an agency or program during the current fiscal year in 
order to protect against budgetary shortfalls.81  Sometimes, supplemental appropriations provide 
funding for authorizations that occur after the regular budget process, other times the proper 
authorization has been in place for quite some time.82  As found in 31 U.S.C. § 1107,83 the 
President can “submit to Congress proposed deficiency and supplemental appropriations the 
President decides are necessary because of laws enacted after submission of the budget or that 
are in the public interest.”84  The President’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
generally discourages agencies from engaging in actions that may lead to the need for 
                                                 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Hungerford, CRS, at 7. 
80 Id. at 1 (citing Congressional Budget Office, CBO data on Supplemental Budget Authority for the 2000s, at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6630/SuppApprops.pdf, last visited May 1, 2009). 
81 See SCHICK at 215. 
82 See Hungerford, CRS, at 2. 
83 31 U.S.C. § 1107. 
84 Id. 
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supplemental appropriations.85  In fact, according to the OMB, “it will only consider requests for 
supplemental and amendments when: 
 Existing law requires payments within the fiscal year (e.g., pensions and entitlements); 
 An unforeseen emergency situation occurs (e.g., natural disaster requiring expenditures for the 
preservation of life or property); 
 New legislation enacted after the submission of the annual budget requires additional funds within 
the fiscal year; 
 Increased workload is uncontrollable except by statutory change; or 
 Liability accrues under the law and it is in the Government’s interest to liquidate the liability as 
soon as possible (e.g., claims on which interest is payable).”86 
Despite this, it is common for the President to request several supplemental 
appropriations during the fiscal year.87  During the 1970s and 1980s, supplemental 
appropriations were often used to cover shortfalls in mandatory spending. Since 1990, 90% of 
supplemental appropriations were for discretionary spending.88           
 Once a supplemental appropriations request is made, it is referred to the House and 
Senate Appropriations Committees.89  The President commonly flags supplemental 
appropriations with an emergency designation.90  This typically allows supplemental 
appropriations to receive less scrutiny.  As Thomas Hungerford point out, “spending determined 
to be for an emergency by both the President and Congress has been effectively exempt from the 
deficit targets, budget caps, and PAYGO requirements.”91 Additionally, the President is not 
required to include the usual budget justification material prepared in support of these requests.  
Although emergency designations are subject to a point of order where a Member of Congress 
                                                 
85 See Hungerford, CRS, at 2 (citing Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-11 (June 2008), p. 1, § 110). 
86 Id. 
87 “Over the past 25 years, Congress and the President have enacted one to eight supplemental appropriations or rescissions each 
year.” Id. 
88 Hungerford, CRS, at 2. 
89 See SCHICK at 256. 
90 See Hungerford, CRS, at 3. 
91 Hungerford, CRS, at 3. 
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raises a motion to strike the emergency designation,92 as GAO-08-314 states, “this step is rarely 
taken.”93   
Even when supplemental appropriation requests are made without emergency 
designation, the urgent nature of many of the President’s requests have left Congress with little 
time to act before a particular agency or project runs out of money.94  This forces House and 
Senate into a compressed decision making process where they must quickly decide whether to 
designate the supplemental appropriation as emergency themselves,95 raise the funding limits set 
in the original budget resolution,96 refuse or reduce the supplemental request,97 or use rescissions 
on other parts of the budget.98  In the past, Congressional use of rescissions to balance 
expenditures from supplemental appropriations was common,99 but this practice has died out.100  
Between 2003 and 2008 only about 5% of supplemental appropriations were balanced with a 
corresponding rescission.101  Another concern is the common inclusion of unrelated 
Congressional earmarks into supplemental appropriations.102 
Perhaps the most important aspect of supplemental appropriations is the fact that the 
costs associated with these appropriations are not fully contemplated during the regular budget 
process.  This allows supplemental appropriations to avoid bartering that occur during the regular 
budget process.  Additionally, due to the likely future consideration of supplemental 
appropriation requests, the President’s Budget and the Congressional Budget Resolution give an 
incomplete picture.103    
 
                                                 
92 See U.S. Gov't Accountability Office,  SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS Opportunities Exist to Increase Transparency 
and Provide Additional Controls 22 (Jan. 2008), (available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08314.pdf ) (last visited May 1, 
2009) [hereinafter GAO-08-314]. 
93 Id. 
94 See SCHICK at 256-260. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 “For the FY1981-FY1985 period, 22% (25% in present value terms) of supplemental appropriations were offset through 
rescissions.15 Over the period covered by the deficit targets (FY1986-FY1990), over 40% of the supplemental appropriations 
were offset.” Hungerford, CRS 5. 
100 Infra note 97. 
101 Hungerford, CRS, at 5. 
102 ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS, 259 (rev. ed. 2007). 
103 Supra note 82.   
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Section IV:  The Historic Use of Supplemental Appropriations 
    The goal of the supplemental appropriations process is to provide a means for dealing 
with unexpected turn of events, most commonly, disaster and war.104  GAO-08-314 indicates the 
breakdown of supplemental appropriations from fiscal year 1997 through fiscal year 2006: 
[A]n analysis of the type of emergency prompting the need for the supplemental shows that 
defense-related emergencies received over 50 percent of the emergency-designated funds. In 
comparison, 28 percent was to respond to natural or economic disasters and 16 percent went to 
antiterror, security, and post-9/11 activities. International humanitarian assistance, pandemic 
influenza, and other activities comprised 3 percent of the total emergency-designated supplemental 
funds provided over the 10-year period.105  
Disaster 
Disaster, almost by definition, is unexpected and often unavoidable.  Therefore, Congress 
has used supplemental appropriations, usually at the President’s request, as a means to provide 
assistance. In these circumstances, one would imagine that the emergency designation of the bill 
is not up for debate and that Congressional action is relatively timely. 
From the start of fiscal year 1989 through the February of fiscal year 2009, Congress has 
appropriated roughly $271 billion toward non-agriculture disaster assistance.106  This funding 
was in response to hurricanes, floods, tornadoes, wild-fires, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks.107  
Since 1997, disaster response has been the second largest cause of supplemental appropriations 
behind those made in response to military operations.108         
Agricultural Assistance 
 The need for agriculture assistance is another common cause of supplemental 
appropriations.  According to a Congressional Research Service report release November 26, 
2008, between fiscal year 1989 through the February of fiscal year 2009, “36 appropriations, 
authorization, or farm disaster acts added approximately $61.8 billion in supplemental funding 
                                                 
104 Hungerford, CRS, at 5. 
105 GAO-08-314, at 3.  
106 Justin Murray, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Legislation for Disaster Assistance: Summary Data, at 1 Cong. Res. 
Service, Oct. 31, 2008 (available at http://opencrs.com/document/RL33226 (last visited May 1, 2009). 
107 Id. at 1-2. 
108 GAO-08-314, at 3. 
 14
for U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) programs.”109 This funding primarily provides 
assistance to farmers facing hardship from tough economic conditions and/or crop disaster.110  
The CRS report provides an overview: 
Since FY1989, a large portion ($43.7 billion) of the total supplemental funding has been paid 
directly to farmers, primarily through two mechanisms: “market loss payments” ($21.4 billion, all 
from FY1999 to FY2001) to compensate for low farm commodity prices, and crop disaster 
payments ($22.34 billion) paid to any producer who experienced a major crop loss caused by a 
natural disaster. The remaining $18.1 billion has funded a wide array of other USDA programs, 
including livestock feed assistance programs, farm conservation programs, specialty crop 
assistance, farm loans, and non-farm USDA programs such as overseas food aid, food and 
nutrition programs, and rural development and housing assistance.111 
Changing Economic Conditions 
 A third cause of supplemental appropriations is a change of economic conditions.  This 
can cause increased federal spending commitment under mandatory spending programs. This has 
historically been a major driver of supplemental requests.   
Throughout the 1970s, supplemental appropriations as a portion of total appropriations 
generally hovered around 4-8%.112  During a recession from 1975 through 1977, this figure 
ballooned to an average of 12.2%.113  Half of these supplemental appropriations were made to 
address changing economic conditions.114  These increases were primarily a result of the 
unemployment and food stamp programs and heightened economic inflation.115  As a 1981 
Congressional Budget Office Working Paper points out, “these were automatic increases 
following the rise in the number of eligible recipients caused by higher than expected 
                                                 
109 Ralph M. Chite, Emergency Funding for Agriculture: A Brief History of Supplemental Appropriations, FY1989-FY2009, at 
Summary Page Cong. Res. Service, Nov. 26, 2008 (available at http://opencrs.com/document/RL31095) (last visited May 1, 
2009). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Cong. Budget Office, SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS IN THE 1970s (July 1981), (available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=5206&type=0) (last visited  May 1, 2009). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
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unemployment.”116  Inflation played a role by driving up entitlements based on cost of living 
indexes.117   
In the early 1980s, changing economic conditions still played a role and supplemental 
appropriations were needed to once again cover increasing federal commitments based on 
unemployment.118  Despite this, supplemental appropriations were much smaller during the 
1980s and “the amount of new budget authority contained in supplemental appropriations bills 
fell after 1981 from over 3% of total budget authority to 0.1% in 1988.”119   
 Throughout the 1990s, the level of supplemental appropriations remained low.120  The 
appropriations that did occur were less a result of changing economic conditions and more a 
result of war and disaster (as discussed below).121  Since 2000, the amount of supplemental 
appropriations has skyrocketed compared to the level during 1990s.122  Most of this increase 
occurred not because of changing economic conditions (though the global recession of 2009123 
may change this), but due to heightened use of supplemental appropriations as a source of 
funding for military operations.124  
 Although a historically significant cause of supplemental appropriations, reforming 
supplemental appropriations made in response to changing economic conditions is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  These appropriations are usually mandatory due to unexpected increases in 
entitlement commitments.  Proper reform in this area would, therefore, require an in-depth look 
at entitlement programs and mandatory spending. 
 
 
                                                 
116 Cong. Budget Office, SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS IN THE 1970s (July 1981), (available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=5206&type=0) (last visited  May 1, 2009). 
117 Id. 
118 Hungerford, CRS, at 3. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 4. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 See Neil Irwin, Recession Deepening Across Regions, Industries, Fed Says, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2009, at D01 (available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/04/AR2009030402338_pf.html) (last visited May 1, 2009). 
124 Hungerford, CRS, at 4. 
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Military Operations 
 The President and Congress have commonly funded military operations through 
supplemental appropriations, at least during a military operation’s initial years.125  This is not 
surprising as most military actions are relatively unexpected -- in the sense that although there 
may be contingency plans in place, it is usually uncertain that they will need to be acted on until 
shortly beforehand.   
 At the start of the Korean War, Congress initially provided funds for fiscal year 1951 in 
the form of supplemental appropriations of $32.8 billion to the Department of Defense (DoD) 
out of a total DoD appropriation of $45.8 billion.126  Following the initial outbreak, the President 
and Congress shifted gears and used the normal appropriations process to provide funding.127  In 
fiscal year 1952, supplemental appropriations only made up $1.4 billion of a $56.6 billion total 
DoD appropriation, and in fiscal year 1953 all $44.3 billion in appropriations were done through 
the regular process.128  
 The Vietnam War followed a roughly similar pattern.  Initially, during fiscal year 1965 
through fiscal year 1966, military operations were funded almost entirely through supplemental 
appropriations.129  Between fiscal year 1967 through fiscal year 1969, the regular appropriations 
process was the dominant source of funding, although supplemental appropriations were 
sometimes used when initial funding ran out.130  From fiscal year 1970 through the end of the 
war in fiscal year 1975, the sole source of funding was the regular appropriations process.131 
 The next major example of supplemental appropriations funding military operations was 
the Persian Gulf War during 1990 through 1991.  This operation was paid for almost exclusively 
by a $42 billion supplemental appropriation for fiscal year 1991.132  Combat operations declined 
                                                 
125 See Stephen Daggett, Military Operations: Precedents for Funding Contingency Operations in Regular or in Supplemental 
Appropriations Bills, 1 Cong. Res. Service, June 13, 2006 (available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22455.pdf) (last 
visited May 1, 2009) [hereinafter Daggett, CRS]. 
126 Daggett, CRS, at 3-4. 
127 Id.   
128 Id.  
129 Id. 4-6. 
130 Daggett, CRS, at 4-6. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 6. 
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quickly and ended soon after.  Neither additional regular nor additional supplemental funding 
was needed.133 
 Throughout the 1990s, operations in Somalia, Southwest Asia, Haiti, Kosovo, and Bosnia 
were all initially funded through supplemental appropriations, but all eventually received funding 
through regular defense appropriation bills.134  
 More recently, the war on terror and military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are 
examples of the heavy use of supplemental appropriations.  Total supplemental appropriations 
for fiscal year 2001 to 2008 were roughly $743.7 billion.135  On May 7, 2009, President Obama 
proposed shifting some these costs into the regular appropriations process.136  Despite this, on 
April 9, 2009, President Obama submitted to Congress “a supplemental appropriations request 
totaling $83.4 billion [for] ongoing military, diplomatic, and intelligence operations.”137  It 
remains to be seen whether President Obama will limit future supplemental appropriations.  
Historical Analysis 
Supplemental appropriations represent a significant cost not accounted for through the 
regular appropriations process.  Historically, the primary driver of these costs has been a 
combination of changing economic conditions and military operations.138  Recently, the primary 
driver has been military operations.  It is likely that much of the cost from military operations is 
unavoidable and difficult to estimate, but past precedent does provide examples of the President 
and Congress successfully using the regular budget process to pay for these operations.139  
Additionally, a look at historical trends may provide a means of addressing and incorporating 
                                                 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 See Daggett, CRS, at 1; See Hungerford, CRS, at 1; See Cong. Budget Office, CBO data on Supplemental Budget Authority 
for the 2000s, at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6630/SuppApprops.pdf, last visited  May 1, 2009). 
136 The White House – Press Office, Budget Fact Sheet and Link, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Budget-Fact-
Sheet-and-Link/ (last visited May 1, 2009) (“His Budget includes an historic down payment on health care reform, the key to our 
long-term fiscal future, and was constructed without commonly used budget gimmicks that, for instance, hide the true costs of 
war and natural disasters.”). 
137 The White House – Press Office, Text of Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Text-of-Letter-from-the-President-to-the-Speaker-of-the-House-of-Representatives/ 
(last visited May 1, 2009). 
138 See Hungerford, CRS, at 3-4. 
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into the regular budget process the likely funding needed to address disaster – natural disaster, 
agricultural disaster, and otherwise. 
Section V: Reform Proposal: The Transparency and Accountability in Supplemental 
Appropriations Act (TASA) 
This paper proposes that in order to create transparency and accountability in the 
supplemental appropriations process, Congress should implement two reforms: first, the creation 
of an Emergency Trust Fund that will be included in the regular budget; and second, a 
requirement that the President’s Budget and any Congressional Budget Resolution include 
Contingency Allowances representing the level of any supplemental appropriations used to pay 
for military conflicts during the prior fiscal year.140  These reforms should be made statutory in 
nature, and introduced in a piece of legislation this paper titles the Transparency and 
Accountability in Supplemental Appropriations Act (TASA).    
Finding a solution to the fiscal tsunami will require reform on multiple fronts.  Reform of 
the supplemental appropriations process is one of these fronts.  The complete elimination of 
supplemental appropriations would provide a great deal of savings, but such a response is neither 
realistic nor practical.  The federal government needs some sort of mechanism to provide 
funding during emergencies.  That said,  the current system encourages waste and overreaching 
by not incorporating the checks and balances used during regular budgeting.  GAO-08-314 
highlights these issues and questions whether some supplemental appropriations would have 
been more appropriately included through the regular budget process: 
We [The GAO] found $710 million in emergency-designated provisions that appeared to be 
unrelated to the event/issue(s) that may have prompted the supplemental. In addition, we found 
that 35 accounts received supplemental appropriations in at least 6 of the 10 years studied, totaling 
over $375 billion. Twenty-one of these accounts were in DOD and the gross budget authority 
granted to these 21 accounts ($258 billion) comprised over 40 percent of the total gross budget 
authority in the supplemental appropriations enacted over the studied period. Finally, over one-
                                                 
140 These proposals are a combination of original ideas and ideas found in GAO-08-314.  The proposal especially draws upon the 
section of GAO-08-314 dealing with allowances.  GAO-08-314, at 26. 
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third of the supplemental appropriations enacted were available until expended (“no-year” 
funds).141  
This report suggests that some appropriations that could not survive the regular 
appropriations process are being pushed through using the supplemental appropriations process.  
TASA would address these problems in two ways.  By creating the Emergency Trust Fund by 
which the future cost of supplemental appropriations is accounted for during the regular budget 
process, TASA would potentially provide savings by allowing the full cost of the budget to be 
considered at one time.  TASA’s creation of Contingency Allowances would allow the 
President’s Budget and any Congressional Budget Resolutions to more fully account for the 
costs of on-going military operations, therefore “inform[ing] budgetary tradeoffs and decisions 
by highlighting the fact that there is uncertainty and that emergency calls on federal resources are 
likely.”142  
Emergency Trust Fund: 
 TASA’s Emergency Trust Fund would set up as a means to pay for emergency disasters –
- including natural and agricultural disasters.  The fund would be required to maintain a balance 
equal to the average budget authority provided for combating natural disasters during the 
preceding twenty fiscal years.  If passed today, this would require a funding balance of $13.6 
billion.143  Should the emergency trust fund dip below this funding level at any time, it would be 
required that it be replenished in the following fiscal year.  In other words, Congress would be 
required to appropriate additional funds to the fund during the next regular budget process.   
 In order to use funds from Emergency Trust Fund, a requesting agency would require 
‘withdrawal’ approval.  To receive this approval, the agency, through the President, would make 
a request to Congress.  Depending on the subject matter of the request, the request would go to 
an appropriate House and Senate authorizing committee, not the House and Senate appropriation 
                                                 
141 GAO-08-314, at 4. 
142 GAO-08-314, at 27. 
143 See Murray, CRS, at 1 (“The median annual funding in constant dollars during the 20 year period FY1989 through the present 
was $3.8 billion; the mean annual funding in constant dollars was $13.6 billion.).  A funding level of  $13.6 billion would appear 
to adequately cover the funding needs of most years.  See id. at 4-8.   Hurricane Katrina has required funding needs far beyond 
this level.  Historically, an event like Hurricane Katrina appears to be an isolated occurrence.  Regardless, the House and Senate 
Committee on Appropriation’s ability to make Emergency Trust Fund deposits should be able to provide a mechanism for 
Congressional response to any potential extraordinary disasters on par with Hurricane Katrina.  
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committees.  At this point, the request would then need to be passed through both the House and 
Senate much like the current supplemental appropriation process.144   
 The advantage to this process would be two fold.  First, by requiring the Emergency 
Trust Fund to maintain a particular funding level at the start of each fiscal year, TASA would 
allow Congress to account for the full cost of the budget during the regular budgeting process.  
Second, by requiring that authorizing committees handle withdrawals from the Emergency Trust 
Fund, TASA would ensure that an authorizing committee’s policy expertise provide heightened 
insight into whether a withdrawal request is appropriate.145  
 If the Emergency Trust Fund runs out of money before the end of the fiscal year, it will 
be Congress’s decision whether to replenish it early.  In order to replenish the Emergency Trust 
Fund, Congress must make an appropriation to the fund; much like it currently makes 
supplemental appropriations.  An agency seeking emergency disaster funds would require a 
Presidential Replenishment and Withdrawal request, requiring Congressional Withdrawal 
approval from the appropriate House and Senate authorizing committees and Congressional 
Replenishment from the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, followed by proper 
passage from Congress and signature into law by the President. In such a situation, the President 
would make an Emergency Trust Fund replenishment request and Withdrawal request at the 
same time.  This division of power, by adding more players capable of saying no, should make it 
more difficult for wasteful requests to receive final passage. When compared to the current 
supplemental appropriations process, TASA’s Emergency Trust Fund would only add a layer of 
authorizing committee oversight to the emergency supplemental appropriations process.  Such 
oversight should not cause too much delay if expedited funding is truly needed, as a majority of 
the Members of Congress would likely consider it appropriate to act quickly.  
Contingency Allowances and Military Operations   
 The nature of on-going military operations involves a deal of uncertainty.  It is not always 
known exactly how much a particular military operation will cost, and it is not always known 
how long a particular military operation will last.  Army Major Michael Davidson, currently 
                                                 
144 See SCHICK at 256-260. 
145 “Most committees are authorizing committees.  They consider legislation establishing or changing federal programs and 
agencies, prescribing the terms and conditions under which these operate, and overseeing their performance.”  SCHICK at 56.   
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assigned (as of May 1, 2009) as the Military Fellow for Congressman Sanford Bishop, points out 
that, “the importance of supplementals is that they get necessary equipment to a warfighter in 
combat more quickly than would otherwise be possible.”146  Furthermore, unlike disasters, large 
scale military operations needing significant funding do not occur on a regularly enough to make 
a trust fund practical.147  Therefore, TASA acknowledges that supplemental appropriations 
would still be necessary as a source of funding for at least the start of military operations. 
What TASA would do is require that the President’s Budget and that Congressional 
Budget Resolutions include a Contingency Allowance within the fiscal year budget following the 
use of a supplemental appropriation to fund a military operation.  This Contingency Allowance 
would be in an amount equal to the prior year’s supplemental appropriation used to fund an on-
going military operation.  Contingency Allowances would not actually consist of any budgetary 
appropriations or authorizations requests and would, therefore, not, by itself, provide any 
funding.148  Despite this, TASA would provide a “way to inform budgetary tradeoffs and 
decisions by highlighting the fact that there is uncertainty and that emergency calls on federal 
resources are likely.” 149  This use of Contingency Allowances would also allow the public to 
receive a more informed view of the President and Congress’s spending plans for the fiscal year 
and encourage accountability among Members of Congress to their constituents.  
 Should a military operation end up requiring and receiving a supplemental appropriation 
higher than the current fiscal year’s Contingency Allowance, the following fiscal year’s 
Contingency Allowance would increase to represent that funding level.  Should a military 
operation require a lesser amount of funding, and not receive and make use of the full amount of 
appropriations represented in the Contingency Allowance, the following fiscal year’s 
Contingency Allowance would decrease to represent that lesser use of funding.  The idea behind 
this is for the Contingency Allowance to track the on-going cost of a military operation.  Should 
                                                 
146 Interview with Major Michael Davidson, U.S. Army, Military Fellow in the Office of Congressman Sanford Bishop, in D.C. 
(May 4, 2009) (Major Davidson handles Defense Appropriations for Congressman Sanford Bishop.).  
147 Over the past 40 years, there have been five  major military operations requiring extensive military operations, Korea, 
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costs increase, so would the Contingency Allowance; should costs decrease, the Contingency 
Allowance will follow suit.  Since the Contingency Allowance would only track supplemental 
appropriations, the use of the regular budget process to fund military operations would also result 
in a decreased Contingency Allowance.150  This makes sense because the Contingency 
Allowance is intended to inform the regular budget process of potential military operation costs.  
If these costs are already being addressed by the regular budget process, then there is no need for 
the costs to be represented again as a Contingency Allowance.   
 The chart in the Appendix provides an example of how Contingency Allowances would 
work in practice.  
Political Considerations 
 At first glance, as a piece of legislation that drastically reforms one of Congress’s most 
sacred powers, that of appropriation, TASA may seem difficult to pass.151  With further 
investigation, this is not necessarily the case.  TASA would potentially appeal to wide range of 
political leaders and constituencies. 
TASA restricts Congress and the President’s ability to freely make supplemental 
appropriations.  It does this by potentially increasing the initial size of the President’s Budget and 
any Congressional Budget Resolutions by requiring the budgetary inclusion of Constituency 
Allowances and the Emergency Trust Fund, therefore making it more difficult for the President 
and Congress to hide the full cost of the budget through supplemental appropriations.152  Of 
course, this is also part of the appeal of TASA.  Since it would be more difficult to shift 
appropriations off the regular budget through the use of supplemental appropriations, the 
President and Congress would be encouraged to use the regular budgeting process and its 
increased oversight and budget controls.  Congress and the President would be forced to consider 
the budget as a whole and make budgetary decisions accordingly.   
A further cause of discontent may be found in TASA’s Emergency Trust Fund’s 
limitation of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriation’s power.  This may upset 
                                                 
150 This would be due to the Contingency Allowances tracking past supplemental appropriations, not military operation oriented 
regular appropriations. 
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various Members of the House and Senate, but is balanced by the more numerous House and 
Senate Members sitting on authorizing committees such as House Committee on Agriculture, the 
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, the House Committee on Homeland 
Security, and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs who would 
gain jurisdiction over withdrawal requests required by TASA’s Emergency Trust Fund.  
Other critics could argue that TASA’s Contingency Allowances hinder the ability to get 
funding to the military by forcing DoD to compete for funds with other agencies during the 
regular budget process.  In reality, Contingency Allowances would only be included for 
accounting and decision making purposes and the actual process of supplemental appropriations 
for military operations would be left untouched.  Nonetheless, this issue would come down to a 
matter of framing.  TASA supporters would counter the opposition by pointing out that 
Contingency Allowances would ensure that the full funding needs of military operations are 
being properly considered during the regular budget process.  Supporters could also argue that 
the programs on the chopping-block would be non-military related programs that are not 
represented by a Contingency Allowance.   
 Despite any of the difficulties mentioned above, today’s political environment is 
especially receptive to legislation such as TASA.  Several political leaders have focused heavily 
on transparency, accountability, budget discipline, and other open-government type ideas.  
Examples include Democratic President Barack Obama,153 Democratic Senator Russ Feingold,154 
and Republican Senator John McCain.155  As mentioned above, other sources of Congressional 
support may come from Members on the various authorizing committees that would gain 
jurisdiction over withdrawal requests required by TASA’s Emergency Trust Fund.156   
                                                 
153 See WhiteHouse.gov, MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES, 
Transparency and Open Government, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/TransparencyandOpenGovernment/ (last 
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Government.”). 
154  See feingold.senate.gov, Russ Feingold: Deficit – Enforcing Budget Discipline, http://feingold.senate.gov/issues_budget.html 
(last visited May 1, 2009) (“Since I was first elected to the Senate in 1992, I have worked to bring Wisconsin's historic tradition 
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155 See Robert Novak, GOP Pork, Imperiled by McCain, WASH. POST,  Mar. 10, 2008, at A15 (available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/09/AR2008030901428.html) (last visited May 1, 2009). 
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With the backing of open-government minded politicians on both sides of the aisle, 
TASA may be marketed to a broad array of constituencies.  TASA’s potential use as a tool to 
encourage fiscal restraint could be marketed to fiscal Republicans who would look favorably to 
the regular budgeting encouraged by TASA.  Anti-war Democrats may look favorably on 
TASA’s use of Contingency Allowances as a means to fully account for the cost of military 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  On the other hand, Contingency Allowances may be 
marketed to national security oriented constituency groups as a means to ensure on-going 
military operations get proper consideration during the regular budget process.  TASA’s 
Emergency Trust Fund would be appealing to a variety of constituencies who commonly face 
natural disaster, constituencies who would be comforted knowing there is an emergency fund in 
place should the worst happen.  Hurricane prone gulf coast states such as Florida, Texas, and 
Louisiana;157 earthquake and wildfire prone California;158 and flood prone Midwest159 states such 
as Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri could all be sources of Emergency Trust Fund support. 
Conclusion 
 If Congress and the President do not address the upcoming fiscal tsunami, it has the 
potential to drastically disrupt and destabilize the federal budget and the U.S. economy.  
Preventing this calamity will likely require a variety of measures including the reduction of 
federal expenditures.  One source of cost savings may be found by reforming the supplemental 
appropriations process.  TASA has the potential to do just that by providing more transparency 
and political accountability to the supplemental appropriations process.  It would do so by 
creating an Emergency Trust Fund that would be included in the regular budget and by requiring 
that the President’s Budget and any Congressional Budget Resolution include Contingency 
Allowances representing the level of any supplemental appropriations used to pay for military 
conflicts during the prior fiscal year.  By requiring the full cost of the budget to be considered at 
one time, TASA would ensure that wasteful spending cannot avoid the safeguards found in the 
regular budgeting process.  By requiring the full cost of the budget to be considered at one time, 
TASA would also allow the President and Congress to make more informed decisions regarding 
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spending priorities.  This would potentially reduce overall budget costs and contribute toward 
avoidance of the fiscal tsunami. 
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Example of the Use of Contingency Allowances for Funding Operation X 
 
Assumptions: 
 Non-Military Funding Levels in Regular Budget represent all funding other than that used for military operations.  In this chart, non-military 
funding levels remain constant. 
 Funding of Military Operations through Regular Budget represents the amount of military operation funding allocated through the regular budget 
process 
 Funding of Military Operations through Supplemental Appropriations represents the level of military operations funding allocated through 
supplemental appropriations 
 Amount Required to be included as a Contingency Allowance represents the Contingency Allowance level that must be represented in the 
President’s Budget and the Congressional Budget Resolution. 
 Total Proposed Budget Authority represents the figures proposed in the President’s Budget and the Congressional Budget Resolution.  It further 
assumes that these two documents contain the same figures.  This is not likely, but simplifies the chart for explanatory purposes. 
 Total Actual Budget Authority represents the total actual outlays at the end of this fiscal year.  
 
Scenario: Operation X - On Year One, the federal government initiates a military operation, Operation X, costing $100,000 a year.  On Year Two, 
Operation X begins costing $150,000 a year.  This chart shows several ways the federal government could fund the Operation X and the accounting 
consequences. 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 
Funding of 
Operation X 
through 
Supplemental 
Appropriations 
$100,000 $100,000 $150,000 $50,000 $50,000 $0 $0 
Funding of 
Operation X 
through Regular 
Budget 
$0 $0 $0 $100,000 
 
(Part of the 
Operation X is 
funded through the 
regular budgeting 
process this year) 
$100,000 $150,000 
 
(Operation X is now 
being  fully funded 
through the regular 
process now) 
$150,000 
Amount Required to 
be included as a 
Contingency 
Allowance (CA) 
$0 $100,000 
 
(CA equals the 
previous FY’s 
Supplemental 
Allocation) 
$100,000 $150,000 
 
(CA increases 
because the 
previous FY’s 
Supplemental 
Allocation 
increased) 
$50,000 
 
(CA decreases 
because the 
previous FY’s 
Supplemental 
Allocation 
decreased) 
$50,000 $0 
 
(CA equals zero 
as the Operation 
X is now fully 
funded through 
the Regular 
Budget) 
Non-Military 
Funding Levels in 
Regular Budget 
$1,000,000 $1,000,000 $1,000,000 $1,000,000 $1,000,000 $1,000,000 $1,000,000 
Total Proposed 
Budget Authority 
$1,000,000 $1,100,000 $1,100,000 $1,150,000 $1,150,000 
 
(New Operation 
X funding 
included 
through the 
Regular Budget 
does not 
increase the 
Total Proposed 
Budget 
Authority except 
to the extent it is 
greater than the 
CA) 
$1,150,000 
 
(This figure comes 
from the $1,000,000 
allocated for non-
military funding + 
$50,000 accounted 
through CA + an 
additional $100,000 
representing the 
amount of Operation 
X funding included 
in the Regular 
Budget that exceeds 
the CA. 
$1,150,000 
Total Actual Budget 
Authority 
$1,100,000 $1,100,000 $1,150,000 $1,150,000 $1,150,000 $1,150,000 $1,150,000 
 
